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Human twelve-month-olds point 
cooperatively to share interest with and 
helpfully provide information for a 
communicative partner
Ulf Liszkowski
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This paper investigates infant pointing at 12 months. Three recent experi-
mental studies from our lab are reported and contrasted with existing 
accounts on infant communicative and social-cognitive abilities. The new 
results show that infant pointing at 12 months already is a communica-
tive act which involves the intentional transmission of information to share 
interest with, or provide information for other persons. It is argued that 
infant pointing is an inherently social and cooperative act which is used to 
share psychological relations between interlocutors and environment, repairs 
misunderstandings in proto-conversational turn-taking, and helps others by 
providing information. Infant pointing builds on an understanding of others 
as persons with attentional states and attitudes. Findings do not support lean 
accounts on early infant pointing which posit that it is initially non-commu-
nicative, does not serve the function of indicating, or is purely self-centered. 
It is suggested to investigate the emergence of reference and the motivation 
to jointly engage with others also before pointing has emerged.
Keywords: pointing, infant communication, reference, attitude, helping, 
cooperation, inform
Pointing in human primates
Pointing is foundational to human communication and has the primary func-
tion of indicating an object or location in space (e.g., Kita, 2003; Brinck, 2004). 
However, pointing would not be foundational to human communication if its 
indicative function was not understood as being for someone. Pointing is not 
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an individualistic goal-directed action upon the physical environment, like, for 
example, reaching for or manipulating an object. Instead, human pointing is a 
cooperative activity between individuals, a communicative act, which involves 
a sender’s communicative intention to both transmit information and have a 
person receive the information on the basis of the sender’s communicative in-
tention (Sperber & Wilson, 1995). Bratman (1992) has convincingly argued 
that human cooperation involves helping the other continue his part in a joint 
activity. Pointing as cooperative act can also be helpful. For example, in the 
course of joint cooperative activities we frequently point fast and eﬀortlessly 
to provide information for a person, to help her overcome misunderstandings 
about a referent, or to help her ﬁnd items she might be looking for.
Without the given context of a point it would be impossible to derive a 
meaning beyond its indication. For a point to communicate meaning it has to 
be embedded in a context which is construed by the interlocutors’ relations to-
wards each other and the environment. Therefore, interlocutors must be able to 
understand the relations between each other and the environment, i.e. to share 
each other’s attention (Tomasello, 1999), or to mutually manifest knowledge 
(Sperber & Wilson, 1995). Pointing thus provides a means for a ‘meeting of 
minds’ in the external environment. Social-cognitively, human communicative 
pointing in a shared context requires an understanding of the indication as be-
ing about a referent, and an understanding of the interlocutors’ psychological 
relations towards each other and the referent.
Interestingly, non-human primates in captivity also produce the pointing 
gesture (Leavens & Hopkins, 1998) although it is claimed that they lack the 
social-cognitive abilities necessary for this (Povinelli, Bering, & Giambrone, 
2003), have problems in understanding the communicative intent of pointing 
(Itakura, Agnetta, Hare, & Tomasello, 1999), and clearly do not engage in what 
might resemble human-like communication (Tomasello, in press). It might 
seem then that human 1-year-olds too point without a deeper social-cognitive 
understanding, because it has been claimed to emerge only later around 3 to 4 
years (see Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). But human 1-year-olds have no 
problems understanding the communicative intent of pointing (Behne, Car-
penter, & Tomasello, in press; Camaioni, Perucchini, Bellagamba, & Colon-
nesi, 2004) and they become competent linguistic communicators fairly early, 
both of which already reveals some kind of mental understanding. And human 
pointing has been related to symbolic communication theoretically (Werner & 
Kaplan, 1963) and to language acquisition empirically (e.g., Goldin-Meadow & 
Butcher, 2003). Therefore, it is questionable whether pointing in human ontog-
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eny really resembles ape pointing and initially does not reﬂect any mental un-
derstanding, or whether it already bears cognitive and motivational properties 
of uniquely human communicative pointing when it has just emerged.
In resolving this question, this paper reports three recent experimen-
tal studies from our lab (Liszkowski, Carpenter, Henning, Striano, & Toma-
sello, 2004; Liszkowski, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2005; Liszkowski, Carpenter, 
Striano, & Tomasello, in press) which investigated in detail communicative 
motives and social-cognitive abilities of pointing in 12-month-old human in-
fants. New ﬁndings show that infant pointing already is a communicative act, 
even before language has emerged. It is motivated by cooperatively sharing 
interest with or helpfully providing information for other persons and builds 
on infants’ understanding of others as persons with attentional states and at-
titudes. These new ﬁndings are contrasted with existing accounts of infant 
pointing and underlying communicative and social-cognitive abilities which 
are reviewed below.
Review of infant pointing
Bates, Camaioni and Volterra (1975) ﬁrst described infant pointing in a lon-
gitudinal investigation of infant communication. Following Austin’s (1962) 
speech act theory, they proposed a developmental sequence in infant commu-
nication from perlocutionary to illocutionary to locutionary acts. Pointing was 
claimed to correspond to the illocutionary stage, revealing the intent to signal 
to a recipient. However, Bates et al. (1975) also reported pointing which they 
classiﬁed as non-communicative, based on the absence of gaze alternation to 
a recipient. They interpreted non-communicative pointing as a precursor to 
communicative pointing.
Since then, pointing has been suggested to become intentionally com-
municative only later in development, after its initial emergence, at around 15 
months (Desrochers, Morissette, & Ricard, 1995), possibly through caregivers’ 
communicative responses. As a criterion for intentional communication, re-
search has usually relied on gaze alternation to the recipient. Methodologically, 
however, it might be misleading to use looks as the only main criterion to as-
sess communicative intent. For example, infants might alternate gaze simply to 
check on the other person, without communicative intent. And absence of gaze 
alternation would not necessarily mean an absence of communicative intent 
— because infants might simply assume that adults understand the behavior 
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as communicative, or rely on auditory instead of visual information. Other cri-
teria for intentional communication are whether it is done for somebody and 
whether persistence and ﬂexibility in signal-use occur when the recipient does 
not react accordingly (see also Tomasello & Call, 1997). The three new studies 
from our lab will show that 12-month-olds’ pointing already is intended to be 
communicative. 
But infants also point for themselves. Delgado, Gómez, and Sarria (1999) 
observed that infants point even when they are alone in a room, without au-
dience. However, Delgado and colleagues (2002, 2004) also showed that pre-
schoolers at 3 and 5 years still point for themselves. Therefore, it is unlikely 
that such pointing for self is a precursor to communicative pointing — be-
cause it does not disappear when children already point communicatively. In-
stead, such pointing might serve a function similar to that of private speech 
(Vygotsky, 1978)1. This interpretation is supported by DeLoache, Cassidy, and 
Brown (1985) who found that infants sometimes use pointing as a mnemonic 
strategy. Further, Bruner (1983) described an infant pointing for self without 
perceivable referent as “locating in his ‘present’ space an object recalled from 
memory” (p. 76). Pointing for self, then, seems to coexist with rather than de-
velop into communicative pointing in infancy. It might even be hypothesized 
that pointing for self develops only after the communicative function of point-
ing already is established.
Communicative pointing in infancy has been claimed to involve rather 
self-centered motives, like using the adult as a tool to obtain an object (‘proto-
imperative’), or the object as a tool to obtain adult attention (‘proto-declara-
tive’), with an understanding of causality corresponding to the Piagetian level 
5 of sensori-motor development (Bates et al., 1975). Subsequently, these two 
types of communicative pointing have received diﬀerent interpretations in 
terms of their communicative and cognitive complexity (see Brinck, 2004). 
Imperative pointing has typically been interpreted on a leaner, more be-
havioristic account, and declarative pointing on a richer, more mentalistic ac-
count (Camaioni, 1993). For example, Vygotsky (1978) claimed pointing to 
be a ritualized behavior through adults’ repeated interventions to failed at-
tempts of reaching, and Wundt (cited in Werner & Kaplan, 1963) described 
it as an “abbreviated grasp”. But Franco and Butterworth (1996) found reach-
ing and pointing to serve diﬀerent functions in development, and Masataka 
(2003) showed reaching and pointing to be developmentally not associated. 
Nevertheless, presumably because imperative pointing is more about spurring 
others into action, it has been interpreted as a self-centered instrumental act, 
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at most revealing some causal understanding of others’ agency (‘agent of ac-
tion’, Brinck, 2004; Camaioni, 1993; Gómez, Sarria, & Tamarit, 1993). The case 
that apes in captivity and children with autism can point imperatively despite 
the lack of a necessary understanding of others’ mental agency (Tomasello, in 
press; Baron-Cohen, 1989) has lent support to this interpretation. However, 
adults point imperatively with an understanding of others’ mental agency and, 
without other evidence, it is at least possible that typically developing infants 
point in this way as well; we simply do not know.
Declarative pointing, in contrast, has been taken to reﬂect sensitivity to 
others’ mental agency. It is less about spurring someone into action than chang-
ing a person’s attentional state (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1991; Bretherton, McNew, 
& Beeghly-Smith, 1981; Tomasello, 1995). It has been claimed to be motivated 
by sharing attention, a motivation manifest also in other Joint Attention behav-
iors such as gaze following, social referencing, giving, showing and imitating 
(Tomasello, 1999), all of which emerge as a cluster around infants’ ﬁrst birth-
day and are related to the onset of language (Carpenter, Nagell, & Tomasello, 
1998). In addition, apes (however they are raised) and children with autism do 
not point declaratively, presumably because they lack the necessary cognitive 
ability or are unmotivated to do so.
Contrary to rich accounts of early declarative pointing, some researchers 
have expressed skepticism that declarative pointing, when it has just emerged, 
involves an understanding of others’ mental agency (Carpendale & Lewis, 2004; 
Gómez et al., 1993; Moore & Corkum, 1994). For example, Gómez et al. (1993) 
have suggested that infants simply understand a recipient’s behavioral relation 
to a referent when they point. More recently, Moore and D’Entremont (2001) 
have claimed that 12-month-olds do not point to direct others’ attention. In an 
experiment, they found that 12-month-olds pointed equally often at an event, 
irrespective of whether an adult already was looking at it. They concluded that 
infants initially point only to obtain attention to the self.
Camaioni, in her work on infant pointing (1975–2004) took an intermedi-
ate position putting forward both lean and rich accounts. Like Brinck (2004), 
she separated imperative from declarative pointing, and suggested a develop-
mental décalage between these two types. On her account, imperative pointing 
emerged before declarative pointing which she interpreted as a social-cogni-
tive transition from an understanding of other persons as ‘agents of action’ to 
‘agents of contemplation’ (Camaioni, 1993). Whereas she suggested that early 
declarative pointing revealed an understanding of others’ intentionality, she 
claimed that early imperative pointing did not require such an understanding. 
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In her latest work (Camaioni et al., 2004) she empirically addressed this hy-
pothesis, showing that imperative pointing was more frequent than declara-
tive pointing among infants who had just begun pointing, and that declara-
tive, but not imperative pointing was developmentally associated with passing 
Meltzoﬀ ’s (1995) task of imitating failed attempts.
There are thus rich and lean accounts of infants’ early pointing. Mini-
mally, there is agreement that later in development, around the end of infants’ 
second year, declarative pointing is about directing others’ attention (Moore 
& D’Entremont, 2001) and about informational exchange (Franco & Gaglia-
no, 2001). However, infants begin pointing a year earlier, around 12 months 
(Leung & Rheingold, 1981). It is thus not clear what infants do when they have 
just begun pointing. Existing accounts of 12-month-olds’ pointing have not 
systematically been tested and consequently we lack necessary evidence on 
why young infants point. In overcoming this gap, this paper reports three of 
our recent studies which addressed the motives and social-cognitive abilities 
underlying infant pointing at 12 months.
Twelve-month-olds point to share attention and interest
In a recent study, Liszkowski et al. (2004) tested why 12-month-olds point 
in a classical declarative context (see Figure 1). Infants were presented with 
10 interesting events, like hand puppets appearing behind a large screen at a 
distance or lights ﬂashing, and a female experimenter (E) reacted consistently 
in speciﬁc ways to each infant’s pointing. We were interested whether infants 
would be more satisﬁed with one over another reaction and whether they 
would modify their behavior as a function of E’s reaction to their pointing. For 
example, we measured how often infants would point in the diﬀerent social 
contexts, whether they would ‘repair’ their message and repeat pointing to the 
same referent more if E did not react in the expected way, and whether their 
looking behavior to E would diﬀer across situations. Speciﬁcally, we tested four 
hypotheses on what infants might want when they point declaratively. In a Joint 
Attention condition, E responded to an infant’s points by alternating gaze be-
tween the event and the infant and emoted positively about it on the hypoth-
esis that infants want to share attention and interest. In the Face condition, E 
never looked at the event and instead attended to the infant’s face and emoted 
positively to it, on Moore and D’Entremont’s (2001) hypothesis that infants do 
not want to direct attention but just want to obtain attention to the self. In the 
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Event condition, E only attended to the events, on the hypothesis that infants 
just want to direct attention and nothing else, and in the Ignore condition E 
attended neither to the infant nor to the event, on the hypothesis that infants 
might point non-communicatively, for themselves.
Table 1 summarizes the main statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences between 
conditions. The overall ﬁnding was that infants point to share attention and 
interest. First, infants were more satisﬁed in the joint attention condition and 
pointed on signiﬁcantly more trials in that condition compared to the other 
three. Second, infants were not satisﬁed in the Face condition, when E only 
emoted positively to them. In that condition, although E emoted as positively 
Table . Study 1. Summary of Main Results. ‘+’ Indicate Statistically Higher Numbers 





# of looks to E
per trial
Joint Attention + (0.7) − (1.07) − (0.28)
Face − (0.5) + (1.23) − (0.33)
Event − (0.5) + (1.23) + (0.77)
Ignore − (0.4) + (1.19) − (0.44)
Figure . Study 1. Schematic drawing of the set-up. Back: screen with window-open-
ings and protruded stimulus; front: infant in high-chair with an attached table and 
small, attached toy.
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to the infant as in the Joint Attention condition, infants repeated their pointing 
to the same referent signiﬁcantly more often than when she shared attention 
to it. In the Face condition, infants thus attempted to redirect E’s attention to 
the event. Third, infants were not satisﬁed in the Event condition either. When 
E only attended to the event and did not comment back, infants also repeated 
their pointing more within a trial than in the Joint Attention condition. In ad-
dition, they looked more to E than in any other condition, presumably because 
they expected E to comment back. 
Results show, ﬁrst, that infants point intentionally communicatively and 
tailor their communicative behavior to diﬀerent social responses. Second, in 
a declarative context, infants point to share their attention and interest with a 
communicative partner. Sharing attention and interest involves both (i) direct-
ing the other person’s attention and (ii) receiving a comment about the mutu-
ally attended to event; neither alone is suﬃcient.
We have recently followed up these results in a new experiment (Lisz-
kowski et al., 2005) and investigated the two components, directing attention 
and receiving a comment, in more detail. Again we used a declarative context 
(see Figure 2) to elicit pointing, and a male experimenter (E) sitting in front 
of the infant with the back turned to the stimuli responded in one of four spe-
ciﬁc ways. Speciﬁcally, we were interested which of E’s reactions might satisfy 
the infant’s motive to share attention and interest. Therefore we systematically 
Figure 2. Study 2. Schematic drawing of the set-up with barriers.
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violated infants’ expectations of E’s attention and of his comment. E either did 
not share the infant’s attention, i.e. he did not refer to what the infant pointed 
at, or he did not share the infant’s interest, i.e. he commented uninterestedly 
about the referent. First, we wanted to know whether infants would be satisﬁed 
when E simply oriented behaviorally into the direction of the referent with-
out actually attending to it (a barrier obstructed his line of sight). Second, we 
wanted to know whether the adult needed to comment positively, or whether 
a neutral comment would suﬃce. We thus controlled two components of E’s 
reaction to infants’ pointing: (i) the referent of E’s attention and (ii) E’s atti-
tude toward the referent, as expressed in his comment. This resulted in four 
conditions. In the Joint Attention condition, E attended to the infant’s referent 
and emoted positively about it (but never named it), emphasizing his attention 
toward it by turning head and body towards it and slightly extending his arm, 
palm up into its direction. In the Misunderstanding condition, E reacted in the 
same way, except that a barrier obstructed his line of sight to the infant’s refer-
ent and E mistakenly referred to an insigniﬁcant piece of paper attached to the 
barrier. In the Uninterested condition, there was no barrier and E reacted as in 
Joint Attention, except that he commented neutrally about the referent, stating 
his disinterest in it. The No Sharing condition involved the same barriers as in 
the Misunderstanding condition and E commented neutrally as in the Uninter-
ested condition to an alternative referent on the barrier.
Table 2. Study 2. Summary of Main Results. ‘+’ Indicate Statistically Higher Numbers 





# of looks to E 
per trial
Joint Attention + (0.9) − (0.3) − (0.7)
Misunderstanding − (0.7) + (0.5) + (1.7)
Uninterested − (0.6) − (0.2) + (1.9)
No Sharing − (0.6) − (0.3) + (2.2)
Table 3. Study 2. Qualitative Diﬀerences of Point Repetitions between Joint Attention 




to 2nd point 
# of looks to E between
1st and 2nd point
# of vocalizing
during 2nd point
Joint Attention − (4.9) − (0.49) − (0.57)
Misunderstanding + (6.6) + (1.27) + (0.82)
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Table 2 summarizes the main results. First, as in the previous study, infants 
were more satisﬁed in the Joint Attention condition, pointing on more trials in 
that condition than in the other three. Second, in the Misunderstanding condi-
tion, when E emoted as positively as in the Joint Attention condition and be-
haviorally oriented into the same direction but referred to the barrier instead 
of the referent, infants were not satisﬁed. In that condition (Misunderstanding) 
they persisted in their message and repeated pointing to the referent within 
trials more than when E attended to the referent (Joint Attention). In addition, 
these point repetitions were accompanied by signiﬁcantly more gaze alterna-
tion to E and vocalizations, and less impulsive than in the Joint Attention con-
dition (see Table 3). Third, in the Uninterested condition, when E attended to 
the referent just as in the Joint Attention condition but commented neutrally 
about it, infants did not repeat their pointing within trials. Although infants 
were overall less satisﬁed with a neutral comment response — they pointed on 
fewer trials than in the Joint Attention condition — they did not repeat point-
ing within trials in order to receive a diﬀerent response.
Results show, ﬁrst, that infants point to direct another person’s attention to 
the event which they point at. This is in line with the results of the Face condi-
tion in the ﬁrst study. Importantly, results show that infants were not satisﬁed 
when the recipient oriented only behaviorally and simply turned into the di-
rection of the referent, even when he emoted positively. This means that infants 
do not point simply to direct a recipient’s external bodily behavior, or simply 
to elicit a positive comment. Instead, infants point to direct the other person’s 
attentional state to what they themselves attend to. Second, results show that in 
this context, infants prefer a positive over a neutral comment about a mutually 
attended to event. However, in contrast to the Event condition of the ﬁrst exper-
iment, in which infants repeated pointing when they did not receive any com-
ment, in the Uninterested condition, when the comment was not the preferred 
one, infants did not repeat their pointing to receive a diﬀerent reaction from 
E. This shows that infants do not point simply to request a positively emoted 
comment about an event mutually attended to, like they request, for example, 
when imperatively pointing to obtain a cookie. Instead, infants’ pointing in 
such a context rather resembles an oﬀer (see Bruner, 1983), to mutually engage 
about an event and share interest in it with an interested partner.
Taken together, ﬁndings of these two recent studies strongly support the 
interpretation that infants point in a context in which interesting things hap-
pen or appear to share their attention and interest with a communicative part-
ner. Further, ﬁndings do not support alternative, leaner hypotheses of infant 
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pointing in such a context. First, contrary to Desrochers et al. (1995), our 
ﬁndings clearly show that 12-month-olds already point intentionally commu-
nicatively and not simply for themselves. Second, in contrast to Moore and 
D’Entremont’s (2001) hypothesis, infants do not point simply to obtain an 
adult’s attention to themselves. They are more satisﬁed when the adult also 
attends to the referent which they point at (in fact, then the adult attends even 
less to the infant because he divides his attention between infant and object). 
Third, it is unlikely that infants want the adult only to behaviorally orient and 
relate to a referent. Instead, they really want him to see and attend to what 
they attend to. And ﬁnally, infants do not simply request an adult to positively 
emote when mutually attending to an event, as if they imperatively requested a 
positive object-related comment. Instead, infants point to initiate a joint bout 
by oﬀering to share their interest in an event.
Theoretically, it is possible that infants also point interrogatively, to receive 
information about the referent, e.g. its valence or its word label. On such an 
account one would expect infants to point irrespective of how E commented 
(i.e., positively or neutrally), as long as he provided information. However, in 
the current situation infants selectively preferred a positive comment over a 
neutral. Further, in the second study, they were never provided with the actual 
word label of the referent, and this did not aﬀect their pointing substantially 
compared to the ﬁrst study. Whether and when infants point interrogatively 
thus remains an empirical question — in the current context they pointed to 
share attention and interest.
Social-cognitively, ﬁrst, ﬁndings show that infant pointing reveals an un-
derstanding of other persons’ attention. Results show that infants diﬀerenti-
ate between conditions in which the recipient is and is not attending to what 
they point at. This is consistent with recent results on gaze and point-following 
which show that 12-month-olds understand what other persons are looking at 
(Deák, Flom, & Pick, 2000) even in the presence of distractors and when the 
target is behind their own visual ﬁeld. Infants follow others’ looks and points 
over their ﬁrst year of life, attending to what others are attending to (e.g., 
D’Entremont, Hains, & Muir, 1997) and come to reverse roles when they point 
at objects to direct others’ attention to what they attend to. Twelve-month-olds 
thus understand that other persons’ attention can be aligned to an object, just 
as their own can be.
Social-cognitively, second, infants’ motive to share interest suggests that 
they conceive of others as persons with attitudes towards the environment. Just 
as infants come to understand that they can follow others’ attention, infants 
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also experience over their ﬁrst year of live that other persons express to them 
their psychological relations, that is, their attitudes towards the environment 
(see also Hobson, 1994). For example, when adults direct infants’ attention they 
also express their attitude about the mutually attended to referent towards the 
infant, which is often one of positive interest (in other situations adults might 
also direct attention to provide information, e.g. to tell them where a toy is [see 
Behne et al., in press], or to request an object when it is in the infant’s posses-
sion [see Camaioni et al., 2004]). Studies on social referencing have shown that 
infants can link a person’s comment selectively to objects (Moses, Baldwin, 
Rosicky, & Tidball, 2001). However, social referencing is more about the refer-
ent, to discern ambiguity of situations or objects, than it is about sender and 
recipient. Therefore, it has been suggested that infants apply the adult’s com-
ment only to the object, as its valence, and do not understand the comment as 
the adult’s psychological relation to the object (Egyed, Kiraly, & Gergely, 2004). 
Pointing to share attention and interest, however, is not only about the referent. 
It is a joint, cooperative activity, for both sender and recipient. Results show 
that the way an adult comments to the infant about a referent inﬂuences the 
infant’s incidence of subsequent oﬀers to share attention and interest. When 
pointing, infants conceive of a recipient’s comment as expressing his attitude 
about the referent. If the attitude is similar to their own, they share this attitude 
which, in the case of declarative pointing, is one of positive interest.
Motivationally then, pointing at 12 months already is an inherently social 
communicative act, intended for both sender and recipient, and not a solitary, 
self-centered activity of the infant. Infants’ ‘repair’ of misunderstandings re-
sembles conservational turn-taking structures and is helpful for a recipient in 
understanding the communicative intent. The cooperative structure underly-
ing early communicative acts may be interpreted as uniquely human (Toma-
sello et al., in press) and as being at the roots of human sociality (see Enﬁeld & 
Levinson, in press).
Twelve-month-olds point informatively to help others
In another recent study (Liszkowski et al., in press), we further explored in-
fants’ motives for directing other persons’ attention when pointing. Infants’ 
repair of misunderstandings can be interpreted as helpful in proto-conversa-
tional turn-taking. As Bratman (1992) has argued, human shared coopera-
tive activity involves helping a partner in keeping up his part. We therefore 
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investigated whether infants might indeed, in some situations, be motivated 
to help a recipient when pointing. As adults we often point to help others by 
providing information, maybe even more than we point to share interesting 
events. For example, when we see a person searching for something (e.g., walk-
ing or turning around, looking into various directions, inspecting various lo-
cations — looking for something), we often help that person by pointing out 
for her what she is looking for (or what we believe she might be looking for). 
Clearly, in such a situation we neither point to request the referent for our-
selves, nor to express our excitement about it. Instead, one points to inform 
a person about an object’s location, to help her ﬁnd it. Interestingly, we help-
fully point things out for persons who we do not know and might never see 
again (e.g., on the street, in a concert, on a train, etc.), without direct beneﬁt 
to ourselves. Such helping behavior can be interpreted as part of a cooperative 
activity (being together on a street, in a concert, in the same political party, in a 
social psychology experiment; see Clark, in press). It might also be interpreted 
as altruistically helping a stranger, although there are arguably no ‘high’ costs 
involved (e.g., risk of life), and it might not extent to ‘non-peer’ strangers (e.g., 
radical opponents of one’s favorite soccer team, political party, etc.). In any 
case, such type of pointing is informative in helping another person ﬁnd what 
she is looking for. The motive of informative pointing thus departs from the 
classical dichotomy of imperative and declarative pointing in infancy because 
it is neither to obtain an object for self nor to share interest in it. Instead, the mo-
tive is to helpfully provide information for the other.
In this study we investigated whether infants point informatively. In the 
main experiment, a female experimenter (E) demonstrated on each of twelve 
trials an action to the infant, which always involved one of two objects (the 
target). Then, both objects (target and distractor) disappeared out of E’s but not 
the infant’s view, for example they were dropped accidentally, displaced on a 
shelf behind E, or used up while replica objects remained visible to the infant. 
After the disappearance, E attempted to repeat the action and began searching 
for the target object. She ﬁrst looked for herself, then emphasized her search 
with an unspeciﬁc verbal cue (“where is it?”) and then explicitly asked the in-
fant using the object label (“[Name], where is the [target]?”).
Results were that infants pointed in such a situation, even when poten-
tially interesting sounds or movements of the referent were absent, or when 
there was no displacement at all (e.g., when the objects were used up). Infants 
pointed signiﬁcantly more to the target which E was looking for than to a dis-
tractor simultaneously displaced (see Figure 3). Requestive accompaniments 
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or repeated pointing after E had retrieved the object were rare and infants 
pointed mostly before E verbally asked about the object.
Findings show that infants point informatively to provide information for 
another person. Pointing in such a context is not so much about a sender’s 
relation to a stimulus, to share it, than about a recipient’s relation to it, to help 
him. The results show that infants do not only direct an adult’s attention in 
response to externally salient, exciting events (e.g. Butterworth et al., 2002) 
but also because of a recipient’s relation to the referent, e.g. to ﬁnd it. There are 
good reasons to believe that infants did not simply request the object for them-
selves, nor to have the adult simply do an action. First, requestive accompani-
ments typically associated with imperative pointing were very rare, and when 
E had retrieved the object, infants rarely attempted to obtain it. And second, 
most of the actions were not particularly interesting, without speciﬁc eﬀects, 
and infants were never involved in them (they simply watched E). In addition, 
in a prior experiment (reported in Liszkowski et al., in press), the objects which 
disappeared were previously not involved in a particular goal-directed action 
and infants still pointed.
Figure 3. Study 3. Percent of trials with a point to target and distractor. * indicate 
statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences (p < .05).
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Social-cognitively, ﬁrst, informative pointing reveals infants’ understand-
ing of a recipient’s relation to an object. To point informatively, one must un-
derstand what the addressee wants. In this context, infants understood E’s in-
tention to ﬁnd an object and continue an action, and helped to complete his 
goal by pointing out the object. Results thus reveal an understanding of others’ 
goals and intentions to be present in infant pointing at twelve months. Second, 
in line with the two previous studies on declarative pointing, our ﬁndings of 
informative pointing foster the interpretation that infants conceive of others 
as persons with attentional states who can sometimes lack relevant informa-
tion. This is consistent with recent results by Tomasello and Haberl (2003) who 
showed that 12-month-olds can discern what is new for someone else. The 
ﬁndings extend previous work on older children’s informational exchange in 
declarative (Franco & Gagliano, 2001) and imperative (O’Neill, 1996) contexts, 
and suggest that infants’ informative pointing already reﬂects an understand-
ing of persons having information states about the environment.
Motivationally, ﬁndings are that infants provide information freely without 
concern for immediate personal beneﬁt which reveals the prosocial motivation 
of helping a communicative partner. This extends previous work by Rheingold 
(1982) who showed that older infants participate in joint actions, like clean-
ing up or opening things. In this study, physical assistance was not required 
and it may be that humans are especially inclined to help communicatively. 
Helping others is an integral part of human cooperation (Bratman, 1992). This 
study therefore supports the interpretation that infant pointing is a humanly 
cooperative, communicative act. The motivation to provide information and 
help other persons might be seen as the initial ontogenetic emergence of the 
uniquely human ability to teach and instruct other persons. Parts of such coop-
erative instructing are suggested to emerge early in ontogeny, before language, 
in communicative behaviors like informative pointing.
Conclusion: Infant pointing is a cooperative, communicative act
New ﬁndings of three recent experimental studies presented here (Liszkowski 
et al., 2004, 2005, in press) show that human pointing, when it has just emerged, 
is a communicative act which involves the intentional transmission of infor-
mation by directing another person’s attention to an indicated object or event. 
Liszkowski et al.’s new approach to pointing which considers motives instead of 
a general diﬀerentiation between diﬀerent types of pointing shows that infants’ 
50 Ulf Liszkowski
motives of pointing are humanly cooperative in nature. Speciﬁcally, infants’ 
pointing at 12 months is motivated by mutually sharing interest in an event 
with a communicative partner. Moreover, in addition, infants point to help by 
providing information for another person, a motive which has previously not 
been investigated even though it is very common in adult everyday pointing. 
Findings thus do not support lean accounts of early infant pointing which have 
suggested that it is initially non-communicative, does not serve the function 
of indicating, or is purely self-centered. Therefore, it also seems that human 
pointing in ontogeny is already fundamentally diﬀerent in its function and use 
to the gestures exhibited by apes in captivity. Future research needs to empiri-
cally investigate developmental antecedents of infant pointing by investigating 
the role of early social interaction in the ontogenetic emergence of reference 
and, interwoven with the emergence of referential behaviors, the motivation to 
cooperate with and help each other.
Acknowledgements 
This paper is in memory of Luigia Camaioni. I am thankful to Emily Wyman and Mike 
Tomasello for comments on a previous version. Parts of this paper were presented at the 
Workshop for Gestural Communication in Non-human and Human Primates, Leipzig, Ger-
many, 2004, and at the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research, Sympo-
sium 134 “Roots of Human Sociality: Culture, Cognition, and Human Interaction”, October 
2–9, 2004, Duck, North Carolina, US.
Note
. I am thankful to B. Delgado and J. C. Gómez for insightful discussions on this point.
References
Austin, John L. (1962). How to do things with words. New York: Oxford University Press.
Baron-Cohen, Simon (1989). Perceptual role-taking and protodeclarative pointing in au-
tism. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 7 (2), 113–127.
Baron-Cohen, Simon (1991). Precursors to a theory of mind: Understanding attention in 
others. In Andrew Whiten (Ed.), Natural theories of mind: Evolution, development and 
simulation of everyday mindreading (pp. 233–251). Oxford (UK): Blackwell.
Bates, Elizabeth, Luigia Camaioni, & Virginia Volterra (1975). The acquisition of performa-
tives prior to speech. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 21(3), 205–226.
 Pointing to share interest and provide information for others 5
Behne, Tanya, Malinda Carpenter, & Michael Tomasello (in press). One-year-olds compre-
hend the communicative intentions behind gestures in a hiding game. Developmental 
Science.
Bratman, Michael (1992). Shared cooperative activity. The Philosophical Review, 101, 327–
341.
Bretherton, Inge, Sandra McNew, & Marjorie Beeghly-Smith (1981). Early person knowl-
edge as expressed in gestural and verbal communication: When do infants acquire a 
“theory of mind”? In Michael E. Lamb & L. R. Sherrod (Eds.), Infant social cognition: 
Empirical and theoretical considerations. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Brinck, Ingar (2004). The pragmatics of imperative and declarative pointing, Cognitive Sci-
ence Quarterly, 3 (4).
Bruner, Jeromy (1983). Child’s talk. New York; London: Norton & Company.
Butterworth, George, Fabia Franco, B. McKenzie, L. Graupner & B. Todd (2002). Dynamic 
aspects of visual event perception and the production of pointing by human infants. 
British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 20, 1–24.
Camaioni, Luigia (1993). The development of intentional communication: A re-analysis. In 
Jacqueline Nadel & Luigia Camaioni (Eds.), New perspectives in early communicative 
development (pp. 82–96). London: Routledge.
Camaioni Luigia, Perucchini Paola, Bellagamba Francesca, & Cristina Colonnesi (2004). 
The role of declarative pointing in developing a theory of mind. Infancy, 5, 291–308.
Carpendale, Jeremy & Charlie Lewis (2004). Constructing an understanding of mind: The 
development of children’s social understanding within social interaction. Behavioral 
and Brain Science, 27(1), 79–96.
Carpenter, Malinda, Katherine Nagell, & Michael Tomasello (1998). Social cognition, joint 
attention, and communicative competence from 9 to 15 months of age. Monographs of 
the Society of Research in Child Development, 63(4), Serial No. 176.
Clark, Herbert H. (in press). Social actions, social commitments. In Nick Enﬁeld & Steve 
Levinson (Eds.), The roots of human sociality: Culture, cognition, and interaction. Ox-
ford: Berg.
Deák, Gedeon O., Ross A. Flom, & Anne D. Pick (2000). Eﬀects of gesture and target on 
12- and 18-month-olds’ joint visual attention to objects in front of or behind them. 
Developmental Psychology, 36(4), 511–523.
Delgado, Begoña, Juan C. Gómez, & Encarnacion Sarriá (2004). Is pointing more than a 
communicative gesture? A study about the role of pointing in regulating one’s own at-
tention. Poster presented at the 18th Biennal meeting of the International Society for the 
Study of Behavioural Development, Gent, Belgium.
Delgado, Begoña, Juan C. Gómez, & Encarnacion Sarriá (2002). Can young children use 
their pointing gestures as a private tool for regulating their thought processes? Poster 
presented at the 32nd Annual Meeting of the Jean Piaget Society, Philadelphia, USA.
Delgado, Begoña, Juan C. Gómez, Encarnacion Sarriá (1999). Non-communicative pointing 
in preverbal children. Poster presented at the IXth European Conference on Developmen-
tal Psychology, Spetses, Greece. 
DeLoache, Judy S., Deborah J. Cassidy, & Ann L. Brown (1985). Precursors of mnemonic 
strategies in very young children’s memory. Child Development, 56(1), 125–137.
52 Ulf Liszkowski
 D’Entremont, Barbara, S.M. Hains, & Darwin Muir (1997). A demonstration of gaze fol-
lowing in 3- to 6-month-olds. Infant Behavior and Development, 20(4), 569–572.
Desrochers, Stephan, Paul Morissette, & Marcelle Ricard (1995). Two perspectives on point-
ing in infancy. In Chris Moore & Philip J. Dunham (Eds.), Joint attention: Its origins and 
role in development (pp. 85–101). Hillsdale NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Egyed, K., I. Kiraly, & G. Gergely (2004). Object-centered versus agent-centered interpreta-
tions of attitude expressions. Poster presented at the International Conference on Infant 
Studies, Chicago.
Enﬁeld, Nick & Steven Levinson (Eds.) (in press). The roots of human sociality: Culture, 
cognition, and interaction. Oxford: Berg.
Franco, Fabia & Antonino Gagliano (2001). Toddlers’ pointing when joint attention is ob-
structed. First Language, 21(63), 289–321.
Franco, Fabia & George Butterworth (1996). Pointing and social awareness: Declaring and 
requesting in the second year. Journal of Child Language, 23(2), 307–336.
Goldin-Meadow, Susan & Cynthia Butcher (2003). Pointing toward two-word speech in 
young children. In Sotaro Kita (Ed.), Pointing: Where language, culture, and cognition 
meet (pp. 85–107). Mahwah, NJ, US: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers.
Gómez, Juan C., Encarnacion Sarria, & Javier Tamarit (1993). The comparative study of 
early communication and theories of mind: Ontogeny, phylogeny, and pathology. In 
Simon Baron-Cohen, Helen Tager-Flusberg et al. (Eds), Understanding other minds: 
Perspectives from autism (pp. 397–426). New York: Oxford University Press.
Hobson, R. Peter (1994). Perceiving attitudes, conceiving minds. In Charlie Lewis & Peter 
Mitchell (Eds.), Children’s early understanding of mind: Origins and development (pp. 
71–93). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Itakura, Shoji, Bryan Agnetta, Brian Hare & Michael Tomasello (1999). Chimpanzees use 
human and conspeciﬁc social cues to locate hidden food. Developmental Science, 2, 
448–456.
Kita, Sotaro (Ed.) (2003). Pointing: Where language, culture, and cognition meet. Mahwah, 
NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers.
Leavens, David A. & William D. Hopkins (1998). Intentional communication by chimpan-
zees: A cross-sectional study of the use of referential gestures. Developmental Psychol-
ogy, 34(5), 813–822.
Leung, Eleanor H. & Harriet L. Rheingold (1981). Development of pointing as a social ges-
ture. Developmental Psychology, 17(2), 215–220.
Liszkowski, Ulf, Malinda Carpenter, Tricia Striano, & Michael Tomasello (in press). Twelve-
and 18-month-olds point to provide information. Journal of Cognition and Development.
Liszkowski, Ulf, Malinda Carpenter, & Michael Tomasello (2005). Twelve-month-old point-
ing: Reference and attitude. Poster presented at the Society for Research in Child Develop-
ment, Atlanta, USA.
Liszkowski, Ulf, Malinda Carpenter, Anne Henning, Tricia Striano, & Michael Tomasello 
(2004). Twelve-month-olds point to share attention and interest. Developmental Sci-
ence, 7(3), 297–307.
Masataka, Nobuo (2003). From index-ﬁnger extension to index-ﬁnger pointing: Ontogen-
esis of pointing in preverbal infants. In Sotaro Kita (Ed.), Pointing: Where language, 
 Pointing to share interest and provide information for others 53
culture, and cognition meet (pp. 69–84). Mahwah, NJ, US: Lawrence Erlbaum Associ-
ates, Publishers.
Meltzoﬀ, Andrew N. (1995). Understanding the intentions of others: Re-enactment of in-
tended acts by 18-month-old children. Developmental Psychology, 31, 1–16.
Moore, Chris & Barbara D’Entremont (2001). Developmental changes in pointing as a func-
tion of attentional focus. Journal of Cognition & Development, 2(2), 109–129.
Moore, Chris & Valerie Corkum (1994). Social understanding at the end of the ﬁrst year of 
life. Developmental Review, 14(4), 349–372.
Moses, Louis J., Dare A. Baldwin, Julie G. Rosicky, & Glynnis Tidball (2001). Evidence for 
referential understanding in the emotions domain at twelve and eighteen months. Child 
Development, 72(3), 718–735.
O’Neill, Daniela K. (1996). Two-year-old children’s sensitivity to a parent’s knowledge state 
when making requests. Child Development, 67(2).
Povinelli, Daniel J., Jesse M. Bering, & Steve Giambrone (2003). Chimpanzees’ “pointing”: 
Another error of the argument by analogy? In Sotaro Kita (Ed.), Pointing: Where lan-
guage, culture, and cognition meet (pp. 35–68). Mahwah, NJ, US: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates, Publishers.
Rheingold, Harriet L. (1982). Little childrens participation in the work of adults, a nascent 
prosocial behavior. Child Development, 53, 114–125.
Sperber, Dan & Deirdre Wilson (1995). Relevance: Communication and cognition (2nd ed.). 
Oxford: Blackwell.
Tomasello, Michael (in press). Why don’t apes point? In Nick Enﬁeld & Steven Levinson 
(Eds.), The roots of human sociality: Culture, cognition, and interaction. Oxford: Berg.
Tomasello, Michael (1999). The cultural origins of human cognition. Cambridge, MA: Har-
vard University Press.
Tomasello, Michael (1995). Joint attention as social cognition. In Chris Moore & Philipp 
Dunham (Eds.), Joint attention: Its origins and role in development. Hillsdale: Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates.
Tomasello, Michael, Malinda Carpenter, Josep Call, Tanya Behne, & Henrike Moll (in press). 
Understanding and sharing intentions: The origins of cultural cognition. Behavioral 
and Brain Science.
Tomasello, Michael & Katharina Haberl (2003). Understanding attention: 12- and 18-month-
olds know what’s new for other persons. Developmental Psychology, 39, 906–912.
Tomasello, Michael & Josep Call (1997). Primate cognition. New York, Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
Vygotsky, Lev (1978). Mind in society: The development of higher psychological processes. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Wellman, Henry M., D. Cross, & J. Watson (2001). Meta-analysis of theory-of-mind devel-
opment: The truth about false belief. Child Development, 72(3), 655–84.
Werner, Heinz & Bernard Kaplan (1963). Symbol formation: An organismic-developmental 




Max-Planck-Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology






Ulf Liszkowski is currently at the Max-Planck-Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, 
Leipzig, Germany. His main interest is in the development of communication and cognition 
with a speciﬁc focus on the ontogeny of pointing. Liszkowski obtains his PhD in psychology 
from the University of Leipzig. He holds an MSc in developmental neuropsychology of the 
University of Essex, UK (with distinction), and a Diplom in psychology of the University of 
Hamburg, Germany (with distinction).
 
